Iowa has opted out of the federal exemptions for all debtors,
regardless of residency. “A debtor to whom the law of this state
applies on the date of filing of a petition in bankruptcy is not
entitled to elect to exempt from property of the bankruptcy
estate the property that is specified in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)
(1979).” Iowa Code Ann. § 627.10. In re Williams, --- B.R. ---,
2007 WL 1520998 (Bankr.W.D.Ark.2007).

Nonresident debtors may attempt to use the federal
exemptions under the savings provision because they do not
qualify for all the state exemptions. The saving provision in 11
USC § 522(b) states, “If the effect of the domiciliary
requirement under subparagraph (A) is to render the debtor
ineligible for any exemption, the debtor may elect to exempt
property that is specified under subsection (d).” However,
nearly all cases that have allowed use of the savings clause
have involved situations where none—not some—of the state
exemptions were available to the debtor. In re West, 352 B.R.
905 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2006) (because debtor was not resident of
Indiana and its exemptions were limited to residents, its
exemptions were not available to her and debtor was eligible
for the federal exemptions under the saving provision); In re
Jewell, 2006 WL 2258363 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.2006) (debtors, who
were not residents of Colorado on date of filing were not
eligible for its exemptions because its exemptions were limited
to residents but debtors were eligible for federal exemptions
under the saving provision); In re Crandall, 2006 WL 2051367
(Bankr.M.D.Fla.2006) (because debtor was not domiciled in
New York on the date of filing, and its exemptions were limited
to domiciliaries, debtor was eligible for federal exemptions
under the saving provision); In re Underwood, 342 B.R. 358
(Bankr.N.D.Fla.2006) (savings provision would entitle debtor to
federal exemptions if Colorado’s opt-out applied to her); In re
Robedee, 2007 WL 1576139 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2007) (if
applicable state provides no exemptions to nonresidents, they
may use the federal exemptions under the saving clause); In re
Fabert, 2008 WL 104104 (Bankr.D.Kan.2008) (debtor fits
squarely within the saving provision because applicable state
denies debtor its exemptions). In contrast, In re Katseanes,
2007 WL 2962637 (Bankr.D. Idaho 2007) involved nonresident
debtors who were denied use of less than all of the state’s
exemptions. That court held that the debtors (who could not
use Utah’s homestead exemption) could not claim the federal
exemptions under the saving provision because the word “any”
in the provision requires a denial of all state exemptions before
debtors can invoke the provision. The Oregon court in In re
Tate, 2007 WL 81835 (Bankr.D.Or.2007), apparently
disagreed, allowing debtors to substitute the federal
homestead exemption for that of Texas because the latter was
not available outside that state. Also see In re Williams, --- B.R.
---, 2007 WL 1520998 (Bankr.W.D.Ark.2007) in which the
court apparently interprets “any” as not meaning “all.” So,
there is disagreement over the meaning of “any” in the saving
provision.