Utah has opted out of the federal exemptions for all debtors,
regardless of residency. “No individual may exempt from the
property of the estate in any bankruptcy proceeding the
property specified in Subsection (d) of Section 522 of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act (Public Law 95-598), except as may
otherwise be expressly permitted under this chapter.” Utah
Code Ann. § 78-23-15.
It might be argued that nonresident debtors are entitled to the
federal exemptions under the saving provision because they
cannot use the state homestead exemption on property
outside the state. The saving provision in 11 USC § 522(b)
states, “If the effect of the domiciliary requirement under
subparagraph (A) is to render the debtor ineligible for any
exemption, the debtor may elect to exempt property that is
specified under subsection (d).” However, the court in In re
Katseanes, 2007 WL 2962637 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2007) held that
although the nonresident debtors could not use Utah’s
homestead exemption, they could not claim the federal
exemptions under the saving provision because "any" in that
provision requires that no exemptions be available before the
federal exemptions can be used. Also, see In re Capps, 438 B.
R. 668 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2010) (debtor must be ineligible for all
state exemptions for saving clause to be available). Nearly all
cases in other jurisdictions that have allowed use of the federal
exemptions under the savings provision have done so in cases
where none of the state exemptions were available to the
debtor. In re West, 352 B.R. 905 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2006)
(because debtor was not resident of Indiana and its
exemptions were limited to residents, its exemptions were not
available to her and debtor was eligible for the federal
exemptions under the saving provision); In re Jewell, 2006 WL
2258363 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.2006) (debtors, who were not
residents of Colorado on date of filing were not eligible for its
exemptions because its exemptions were limited to residents
but debtors were eligible for federal exemptions under the
saving provision); In re Crandall, 2006 WL 2051367 (Bankr.M.
D.Fla.2006) (because debtor was not domiciled in New York on
the date of filing, and its exemptions were limited to
domiciliaries, debtor was eligible for federal exemptions under
the saving provision); In re Underwood, 342 B.R. 358 (Bankr.N.
D.Fla.2006) (savings provision would entitle debtor to federal
exemptions if Colorado’s opt-out applied to her); In re
Robedee, 2007 WL 1576139 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2007) (if
applicable state provides no exemptions to nonresidents, they
may use the federal exemptions under the saving provision); In
re Fabert, 2008 WL 104104 (Bankr.D.Kan.2008) (debtor fits
squarely within the saving provision because applicable state
denies debtor its exemptions). However, the Oregon court in In
re Tate, 2007 WL 81835 (Bankr.D.Or.2007), did allow debtors
to substitute the federal homestead exemption for that of
Texas because the latter was not available outside that state.
Also see In re Williams, 369 B.R. 470, (Bankr.W.D.Ark.2007) in
which the court apparently interprets “any” as not meaning
“all.” So, there is disagreement over the meaning of “any” in
the saving provision.